All's Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress
Harvard Business School - Organizational Behavior
Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, Vol. 11, p. 298, 2006
Prior discussions of management turnover during financial distress have examined bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms as distinct groupings with little overlap. Separately investigating rates of turnover in-bankruptcy and out-of-bankruptcy, without a direct comparison between the two, has resulted in a narrowing of the accepted influence of bankruptcy law to post-petition, in-court decisions. Based on new evidence of CEO turnover in 2001, I argue empirically that this distinction between in-court and out-of-court restructuring has become meaningless from a governance perspective. In 2001, filing for bankruptcy did not change the rate of CEO turnover when one controls for financial condition. This statistically significant finding indicates that the shadow of bankruptcy has lengthened, making bankruptcy law a central tenet of governance policy regardless of whether a Chapter 11 petition is ever filed. After presenting these results, this article considers the implications of these results on the changing perceptions of the role of CEOs and the evolution of the multi-pronged U.S. corporate governance system.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Restructuring, CEO Turnover, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G33, G34, J6, J63, K2, K22, M1, M5working papers series
Date posted: October 26, 2005
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