Abstract

 
 

References (39)



 


 



Is it Trust We Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative


Stephanie Rosenkranz


University of Utrecht - Utrecht University School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Utz Weitzel


Radboud University Nijmegen - Economics Department; University of Utrecht - Utrecht University School of Economics

May 2005

Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Discussion Paper No. nr:05-12

Abstract:     
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyze the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players' decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: trust, framing, focal points, alliances, cooperation

JEL Classification: C72, D80, D74, Z13

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 19, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Weitzel, Utz, Is it Trust We Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative (May 2005). Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Discussion Paper No. nr:05-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=828444 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.828444

Contact Information

Stephanie Rosenkranz
University of Utrecht - Utrecht University School of Economics ( email )
Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands
+31 30 253 9806 (Phone)
+31 30 253 7373 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/defaculteit/persoonlijkepagi/rosenkranz/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Utz Weitzel (Contact Author)
Radboud University Nijmegen - Economics Department ( email )
Nijmegen, 6500 HK
Netherlands
University of Utrecht - Utrecht University School of Economics ( email )
Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, 3584 EC
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 921
Downloads: 158
Download Rank: 82,803
References:  39

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.390 seconds