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Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride


Pradeep K. Dubey


SUNY Stony Brook - Center for Game Theory in Economics

John Geanakoplos


Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Ori Haimanko


Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation
October 17, 2005

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1537

Abstract:     
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages when there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Envy, Pride, Wages, Prizes, Bonus

JEL Classification: C72, D01, D23, L14

working papers series


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Date posted: October 19, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Dubey, Pradeep K., Geanakoplos, John and Haimanko, Ori , Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride (October 17, 2005). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1537. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=830924

Contact Information

Pradeep K. Dubey
SUNY Stony Brook - Center for Game Theory in Economics ( email )
Stony Brook, NY 11794
United States
631-632-7555 (Phone)
631-632-7516 (Fax)
John Geanakoplos (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3397 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_gean.htm
Ori Haimanko
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )
Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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