Two-Sided Altruism, Lindahl Equilibrium, and Pareto Optimality in Overlapping Generations Models
Lakshmi K. Raut
U.S. Social Security Administration
Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 729-736, April 2006
This paper extends the Samuelsonian overlapping generations general equilibrium framework to encompass a variety of altruistic preferences by recasting it into a Lindahl equilibrium framework. The First and the Second Welfare theorems hold for Lindahl equilibrium with respect to the Malinvaud optimality criterion but not with respect to the Pareto optimality criterion. A complete characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is provided using the Lindahl equilibrium prices.
Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Altruism, Lindahl Equilibrium, Pareto Optimality, Overlapping Generations
JEL Classification: D51, D62, D64, C62Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 6, 2005
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