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The Parable of the Hare and the Tortoise: Small Worlds, Diversity, and System Performance

David Lazer
Northeastern University - Department of Political Science; Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

Allan Friedman
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government


October 2005

KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-058

Abstract:     
Whether as team members brainstorming, or cultures experimenting with new technologies, problem solvers communicate and share ideas. This paper examines how the structure of these communication networks can affect system-level performance. We present an agent-based model of information sharing, where the less successful emulate the more successful. Results suggest that where agents are dealing with a complex problem, the more efficient the network at disseminating information, and the higher the velocity of information over that network, the better the short run and lower the long run performance of the system. The dynamic underlying this result is that an inefficient network is better at exploration than an efficient network, supporting a more thorough search for solutions in the long run. This suggests that the efficient network is the hare - the fast starter - and the poorly connected network is the tortoise - slow at the start of the race, but ultimately triumphant.

Keywords: Advocacy and Persuasion, Information Technology, Public Management, Science¸ Technology and Public Policy

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 10, 2005 ; Last revised: November 10, 2005

Suggested Citation

Lazer, David and Friedman, Allan, The Parable of the Hare and the Tortoise: Small Worlds, Diversity, and System Performance (October 2005). KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-058. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=832627


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Contact Information

David Lazer (Contact Author)
Northeastern University - Department of Political Science ( email )
Boston, MA 02115
United States
617-373-2796 (Phone)
617-373-5311 (Fax)
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Mailbox 114
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-0102 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/david-lazer
Allan Friedman
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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