Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=834324
 
 

Citations (5)



 
 

Footnotes (161)



 


 



The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement


David R. Stras


Minnesota Supreme Court


Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 90, 2006
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-45

Abstract:     
The concept of life tenure for judges has been roundly criticized in the legal academy, with many scholars advocating a mandatory retirement age or term limits for justices. These command and control approaches, however, do not target the most important factors in the retirement decision. Empirical studies demonstrate that workload, income, and prestige are the paramount factors influencing judicial retirement. Using empirical evidence, this essay proposes a judicial retirement function that can be used to model the retirement decisions of justices and other judicial actors. Rather than constitutional amendment, the incentives approach to retirement suggests that Congress should focus its attention on making incremental institutional modifications, such as to pensions and workload, to encourage retirement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

JEL Classification: K00, K40, K41

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 25, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Stras, David R., The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement. Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 90, 2006; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-45. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=834324

Contact Information

David R. Stras (Contact Author)
Minnesota Supreme Court ( email )
25 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd
St. Paul, MN 55155
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,890
Downloads: 117
Download Rank: 139,819
Citations:  5
Footnotes:  161

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.344 seconds