Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=837667
 
 

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CEO Compensation and Incentives - Evidence from M&A Bonuses


Yaniv Grinstein


Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Paul Hribar


University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business


Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 119-143, 2004

Abstract:     
We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significnatly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEO with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses.

Keywords: CEO compensation, Mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: G34, J33

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: November 8, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Grinstein, Yaniv and Hribar, Paul, CEO Compensation and Incentives - Evidence from M&A Bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 119-143, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=837667

Contact Information

Yaniv Grinstein (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8686 (Phone)
607-254-4590 (Fax)

Paul Hribar
University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business ( email )
Dept. of Accounting
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
United States
319-335-1008 (Phone)
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