Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment
Nancy J. King
Vanderbilt University - Law School
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 58, p. 293, 2005
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 05-34
This article examines parties' ability to circumvent consistency in sentencing by bargaining around the rules that structure sentences within statutory ranges in federal criminal cases. Without careful control by judges, sentencing bargaining carries risks for structured-sentencings systems that may outweigh gains in efficiency. After a discussion of weaknesses in the ability of judges to oversee the factual accuracy of sentencing agreements, the article advances several options that would strengthen that supervisory role, promoting greater accuracy, transparency, and consistency in federal sentencing.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: sentencing, stipulations, plea bargaining, guidelines, presentence report, probation officerAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 15, 2005
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