Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=840847
 
 

References (19)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



How Much Market Access in FTAs? Textiles under NAFTA


Olivier Cadot


University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Celine Carrere


Université d'Auvergne - Clermont 1 - CERDI

Jaime De Melo


University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Alberto Portugal-Pérez


University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics

October 2005

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5264

Abstract:     
This paper estimates the effective market access granted under NAFTA in textiles and apparel by combining two approaches. First, we estimate the effect of tariff preferences and rules of origin on the border prices of Mexican final goods exported to the US and of US intermediates exported to Mexico. We find that one third of the estimated rise in the border price of Mexican apparel products compensates for the cost of complying with NAFTA's rules of origin. We also find that the price of US intermediates exported to Mexico is raised significantly by the presence of rules of origin downstream. Second, simulations from a structural model inspired by our econometric estimates, suggest little market access improvement for Mexican exporters.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: NAFTA, rules of origin, regional integration

JEL Classification: F10, F13, F15

working papers series


Date posted: November 3, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Cadot, Olivier and Carrere, Celine and de Melo, Jaime and Portugal-Pérez, Alberto, How Much Market Access in FTAs? Textiles under NAFTA (October 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5264. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=840847

Contact Information

Olivier Cadot (Contact Author)
University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )
Lausanne, 1018
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Celine Carrere
Université d'Auvergne - Clermont 1 - CERDI ( email )
65 Boulevard Francois Mitterrand
63000 Clermont-Ferrand Cedex 1
France
Jaime De Melo
University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )
40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 705 8273 (Phone)
+41 22 705 8293 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/demelo/Jaime.html
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
Alberto Portugal-Pérez
University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )
40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 970
Downloads: 13
References:  19
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 2.422 seconds