|
||||
|
||||
Underground Gun Markets
Philip J. Cook Duke University - Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy; Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Jens Ludwig Georgetown University - Public Policy Institute (GPPI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh Columbia University - Department of Sociology Anthony A. Braga Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government November 2005 NBER Working Paper No. W11737 Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets drawing on interviews with gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, prostitutes, police, public school security guards and teens in the city of Chicago, complemented by results from government surveys of recent arrestees in 22 cities plus administrative data for suicides, homicides, robberies, arrests and confiscated crime guns. We find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market for guns in Chicago. We argue that these frictions are due primarily to the fact that the underground gun market is both illegal and %u201Cthin%u201D -- the number of buyers, sellers and total transactions is small and relevant information is scarce. Gangs can help overcome these market frictions, but the gang%u2019s economic interests cause gang leaders to limit supply primarily to gang members, and even then transactions are usually loans or rentals with strings attached. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org. Working Paper Series Date posted: January 29, 2006 ; Last revised: July 27, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo6 in 0.141 seconds.