Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=84489
 
 

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Information Asymmetry, The Internet, And Securities Offerings


Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

May 1998

As published in Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law, Vol. 2, pp. 91-99, 1998

Abstract:     
In this Comment, prepared for a Forum on capital formation for small businesses, I express doubts about whether the Internet, as a new communication medium, will significantly reduce the cost of obtaining capital through a public or quasi-public offering. The most important single barrier standing between small companies and capital providers is information asymmetry?potential investors do not know, and cannot easily verify, the quality of the information that a company provides. The internet cannot do much to reduce information asymmetry costs, nor the costs of the reputational intermediaries that emerge in securities markets reduce information asymmetry. On the contrary, the Internet could increase information asymmetry costs by undercutting the effectiveness of the institutions that today provide investors with partial assurance of the quality of the information provided by issuers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

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Date posted: May 7, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S., Information Asymmetry, The Internet, And Securities Offerings (May 1998). As published in Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law, Vol. 2, pp. 91-99, 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=84489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.84489

Contact Information

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
512-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
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