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Geographic Dispersion and Corporate Decision-Making


Augustin Landier


Toulouse School of Economics

Vinay B. Nair


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Julie Wulf


Harvard Business School

January 2006


Abstract:     
We document the role of geographic dispersion on corporate decision-making. First, we find that geographically dispersed firms are less employee-friendly. Second, using division-level data, employee dismissals are less common in divisions located close to corporate headquarters. Third, firms are reluctant to divest in-state divisions. To explain these findings we consider two mechanisms. First, we investigate whether proximity is related to internal information flows. We find that firms are geographically concentrated when information is more difficult to transfer over long distances (soft information industries). Additionally, the protection of proximate employees is stronger in such soft information industries. Second, we investigate how proximity to employees affects managerial alignment with shareholder objectives. We document that the protection of proximate employees only holds when headquarters is located in less-populated counties suggesting concern for proximate employees. Moreover, stock markets respond favorably to divestitures of close divisions, especially for these smaller-county firms. Our findings suggest that social factors work alongside informational considerations in making geographic dispersion an important factor in corporate decision-making.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Economic Geography, Dispersion, Employee Friendliness, Proximity, Social Interaction, Layoffs, Divestiture

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Date posted: November 16, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Landier, Augustin, Nair, Vinay B. and Wulf, Julie M., Geographic Dispersion and Corporate Decision-Making (January 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=848745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.848745

Contact Information

Augustin Landier
Toulouse School of Economics ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
Vinay B. Nair (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-0004 (Phone)
215-898-6200 (Fax)
Julie M. Wulf
Harvard Business School ( email )
Harvard Business School
Boston, MA
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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