Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=849167
 
 

References (24)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Preventing Competition because of Solidarity: Rhetoric and Reality of Airport Investments in Spain


Germà Bel


University of Barcelona - Department of Political Economics

Xavier Fageda


University of Barcelona - Department of Economic Policy

October 2005


Abstract:     
Spain is the only large European country in which airport management is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports,and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system regularly justify it on grounds of interterritorial solidarity. This paper tests whether allocation of investments in airports is effectively based on redistributive purposes, as claimed and looks at other factors to explain such allocation. Our empirical analysis suggests that neither a progressive redistribution target nor the scale economies criterion explain allocation decisions. Instead, we find that political factors have significant influence on the allocation decisions made by the government.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Public Enterprise, Legal monopolies, Air Transportation, Models with Panel Data

JEL Classification: L32, L43, L93, C23

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 17, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Bel, Germà and Fageda, Xavier, Preventing Competition because of Solidarity: Rhetoric and Reality of Airport Investments in Spain (October 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=849167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.849167

Contact Information

Germà Bel (Contact Author)
University of Barcelona - Department of Political Economics ( email )
Av. Diagonal, 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
HOME PAGE: http://www.ub.edu/graap/beling.htm
Xavier Fageda
University of Barcelona - Department of Economic Policy ( email )
Av. Diagonal 690
08034 Barcelona
Spain
0034 934021947 (Phone)
0034 934024573 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 535
Downloads: 54
Download Rank: 221,988
References:  24
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds