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Target-Firm Information Asymmetry and Acquirer Returns

Micah S. Officer
Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance and Computer Information Systems

Annette B. Poulsen
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance

Mike Stegemoller
Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business


April 1, 2008

Review of Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We show that acquirer returns are significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and idiosyncratic return volatility. This finding contributes to an explanation of the determinants of, and value gains from, using stock as a method of payment. The effects of target-valuation uncertainty on both the method of payment and the market reaction to acquisitions are more likely to be apparent in samples of private acquisitions, and that these effects can be masked in samples of acquisitions of publicly held targets. Nevertheless, our results hold for publicly traded targets in multivariate analysis.

Keywords: Acquisitions, Private firms, Method of payment, Intangibles

JEL Classifications: G34, G32

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 22, 2005 ; Last revised: July 30, 2008

Suggested Citation

Officer, Micah S., Poulsen, Annette B. and Stegemoller, Mike A., Target-Firm Information Asymmetry and Acquirer Returns (April 1, 2008). Review of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=851604


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Contact Information

Micah S. Officer (Contact Author)
Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance and Computer Information Systems ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States
Annette B. Poulsen
University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )
Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States
706-542-3645 (Phone)
Michael A. Stegemoller
Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
806-742-3338 (Phone)
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