Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=853244
 
 

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Justice and the Evolution of the Common Law


Richard O. Zerbe Jr.


University of Washington - Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs

November 2005


Abstract:     
Empirical evidence shows, and theory suggests, that the common law tends toward economic efficiency. While various theories attempt to explain this phenomenon, no single one is well accepted. This article provides a simple explanation. It suggests that efficiency arises as a matter of justice. Justice is sought because justice-seeking is a social norm with its own sanctioning force. Justice is sought and efficiency achieved because they substantially overlap. Limitations in the traditional definition of efficiency, however, ensure that efficiency is not congruent with justice. This paper suggests that it can be: the congruence of justice and efficiency will be greater if the definition of efficiency is expanded to include moral sentiments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: justice, efficiency, common law, evolution, moral, Kaldor Hicks, benefit, cost

JEL Classification: D60, K00, N00

working papers series


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Date posted: November 22, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Zerbe Jr., Richard O., Justice and the Evolution of the Common Law (November 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=853244 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.853244

Contact Information

Richard O. Zerbe (Contact Author)
University of Washington - Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs ( email )
Box 353055
Seattle, WA 98125
United States
206-616-5470 (Phone)
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