Abstract

 


 



An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent


Russell F. Pannier


William Mitchell College of Law


William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, p. 695, 1992

Abstract:     
The theory of original intent is based upon the assumption that judicial discretion in the interpretation of laws subverts the democratic process. Originalists seek to guarantee completely determinate legal rules by eliminating the possibility of adjudicative discretion. In contexts in which the application of a legal rule is uncertain, the originalists recommend that judges apply the rule in accordance with the specific intentions of the rulemakers.

This essay states and evaluates the theory of original intent as a principle of judicial interpretation of legislative and constitutional rules, and draws three conclusions. First, the objectives of the theory cannot be achieved by the means of the principle of original intent. Second, in any case, those objectives themselves are based upon an inadequate understanding of the nature of legal rules and, consequently, cannot be achieved by any means. Third, the theory is based upon an inadequate understanding of the nature of a democractic order.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Constitution, Democracy, Intent, Legal Rules, Originalism

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Date posted: November 30, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Pannier, Russell F., An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent. William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, p. 695, 1992. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=857286

Contact Information

Russell F. Pannier (Contact Author)
William Mitchell College of Law ( email )
875 Summit Ave
St. Paul, MN 55105-3076
United States
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