Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=857678
 
 

References (24)



 
 

Citations (11)



 


 



Getting along with Colleagues - Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt?


John S. Heywood


University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee; University of Birmingham - Department of Commerce

Uwe Jirjahn


University of Trier - Faculty of Economics

Georgi Tsertsvadze


University of Hannover - Institute of Quantitative Economic Research


Kyklos, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 557-573, November 2005

Abstract:     
Theory presents two channels through which profit sharing can cause workers to increase their coworkers' productivity: greater cooperation and increased peer pressure. This paper argues that these generate opposite influences on coworker relations, and that which dominates varies according to circumstances and type of worker. Using German data, we show that, for non-supervisory men, profit sharing increases cooperation, but that for those who highly value success on the job, it has no influence on cooperation, and for supervisors it reduces cooperation. Moreover, the findings show striking gender differences in the effect of profit sharing. We contend these patterns fit with underlying theoretical expectations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 23, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Heywood, John S. and Jirjahn, Uwe and Tsertsvadze, Georgi, Getting along with Colleagues - Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt?. Kyklos, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 557-573, November 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=857678 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2005.00302.x

Contact Information

John S. Heywood (Contact Author)
University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee ( email )
210 N. Maryland Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53211
United States
414-229-4437 (Phone)
414-229-3860 (Fax)
University of Birmingham - Department of Commerce
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT
United Kingdom
Uwe Jirjahn
University of Trier - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Trier, 54286
Germany
Georgi Tsertsvadze
University of Hannover - Institute of Quantitative Economic Research ( email )
30167 Hannover
Germany
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References:  24
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