Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems
Oscar Volij
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, Vol 26 No 1, 1997
Abstract:
We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi- transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
JEL Classification: D74, D63, G33
Accepted Paper Series
Suggested Citation
Volij, Oscar, Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, Vol 26 No 1, 1997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=8609
