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Tying: The Poster Child for Antitrust Modernization


David S. Evans


University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group

November 2005


Abstract:     
U.S. antitrust law has made enormous strides in the last twenty years towards becoming intellectually coherent and based on sound economic analysis. Economic analysis now has a preeminent place in evaluating and bringing cases, among enforcement agencies and in the courts. There is no serious debate that unilateral practices should be subjected to a per se test rather than a rule of reason analysis. Likewise, there is no debate among economists or legal scholars that tying should be removed from the genus of unilateral practices and placed in its own leper colony.

The time has therefore come to abandon the per se label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have. The law of tie-ins will thus be brought into accord with the law applicable to all other allegedly anticompetitive economic arrangements, except those few horizontal or quasi-horizontal restraints that can be said to have no economic justification whatsoever. This change will rationalize rather than abandon tie - in doctrine as it is already applied. Modern antitrust analysis does not support the per se condemnation of tying or the Jefferson Parish test. Neither should modern antitrust law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

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Date posted: December 5, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Evans, David S., Tying: The Poster Child for Antitrust Modernization (November 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=863031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.863031

Contact Information

David S. Evans (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
Global Economics Group ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
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