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Relative Wealth Concerns and Financial Bubbles


Peter M. DeMarzo


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ron Kaniel


University of Rochester - Simon Graduate School of Business; CEPR

Ilan Kremer


Stanford Graduate School of Business

September 2005


Abstract:     
We present a simple yet fully rational general equilibrium model that highlights the fact that relative wealth concerns can play a role in explaining the presence and dynamics of financial "bubbles". Because our model has a finite horizon, our explanation for the existence of bubbles is distinct from typical models of bubbles.

We consider a finite-horizon overlapping generations model and show that though agents care only about their own consumption, competition over future investment opportunities makes agents' utilities dependent on the wealth of their cohort and induces relative wealth concerns. To minimize the risk of their relative wealth, agents have an incentive to "herd" in their portfolio choice, distorting asset prices. Herding incentives and price distortions grow over time as the young become wealthier and their impact on the market increases. Though agents anticipate that a negative shock will burst the bubble and lead to a substantial loss, due to relative wealth concerns they are afraid to trade against the crowd. We show that bubbles can emerge as long as relative wealth concerns are sufficiently strong, and there is sufficient heterogeneity across agents' preferences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: bubbles, relative, wealth, overlapping, generations

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Date posted: December 5, 2005  

Suggested Citation

DeMarzo, Peter M., Kaniel, Ron and Kremer, Ilan, Relative Wealth Concerns and Financial Bubbles (September 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=863124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.863124

Contact Information

Peter M. DeMarzo
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-736-1082 (Phone)
650-725-7979 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/people/pdemarzo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Ron Kaniel (Contact Author)
University of Rochester - Simon Graduate School of Business ( email )
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
HOME PAGE: http://rkaniel.simon.rochester.edu
CEPR ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Ilan Kremer
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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