|
||||
|
||||
Sustainable Social Spending
Assar Lindbeck Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) November 2005 CESifo Working Paper No. 1594 Abstract: The paper discusses a number of threats to the financial sustainability of social spending: increased internationalization of national economies, gradually higher relative costs of producing a number of human services, the "graying" of the population, slower productivity growth in the private sector, low employment rates, and various types of disincentive effects related to the welfare state itself, including moral hazard. I argue that threats from gradually rising costs of providing human services and disincentive effects of welfare-state arrangements, in particular moral hazard and benefit dependency, are more difficult to deal with than the other threats. I also discuss the choice between ad hoc policy reforms and automatic adjustment mechanisms, delegated to administrative bodies, for dealing with these threats.
Keywords: sustainable fiscal policy, Baumol's disease, moral hazard, automatic adjustment mechanisms JEL Classifications: E62, H31, H53 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: December 05, 2005 ; Last revised: February 07, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apolloc 6 in 1.204 seconds.