Abstract

  
 

References (32)



 
 

Citations (434)



 


 



The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing


Simeon Djankov


Ministry of Finance; World Bank

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
December 2005


Abstract:     
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically-grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the commonly used index of anti-director rights.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: legal protection, disclosure, stock market

JEL Classification: G3, G38, K22

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 7, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Djankov, Simeon, Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, La Porta, Rafael and Shleifer, Andrei, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (December 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=864645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.864645

Contact Information

Simeon Djankov
Ministry of Finance ( email )
Rakovski Avenue 102
Sofia, 1040
Bulgaria
World Bank ( email )
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4748 (Phone)
202-473-5758 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.doingbusiness.org
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,007
Downloads: 1,435
Download Rank: 4,491
References:  32
Citations:  434

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.532 seconds