References (30)



Differentiating between First Offenses and Repeat Offenses

Bryan C. McCannon

West Virginia University & Center for Free Enterprise; Saint Bonaventure University

July 9, 2007

I present a model where a regulator monitors compliance with a policy by a population of individuals, some of whom repeatedly prefer to violate the policy while others occasionally want to experiment. I show that the regulator can use sanctions, contingent on past violations of the policy, to differentiate between the agents and improve welfare. As a result, a regulator prefers investing in enforcement rather than use maximal sanctions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: experimentation, overdeterrence, regulation, repeat offenses, underdeterrence

JEL Classification: K4, D6

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 6, 2005  

Suggested Citation

McCannon, Bryan C., Differentiating between First Offenses and Repeat Offenses (July 9, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=865084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.865084

Contact Information

Bryan C. McCannon (Contact Author)
West Virginia University & Center for Free Enterprise ( email )
P.O. Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States
Saint Bonaventure University ( email )
PO Box 42
Saint Bonaventure, NY 14778
United States
716-375-2145 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,355
Downloads: 52
Download Rank: 249,630
References:  30

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.344 seconds