Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=867108
 
 

References (39)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Political Economy and the Efficiency of Compensation for Takings


Tim Brennan


University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy; Resources for the Future

James Boyd


Resources for the Future


Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 24, 2005

Abstract:     
To assess compensation for regulation-induced "takings," we model political support for regulation as a function of externalities, landowner wealth, and tax burdens. When competing social interests have equal influence on political outcomes compensation should not be paid. However, when environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence the model yields several counterintuitive implications. For example, disenfranchised environmentalists should support takings compensation, since it reduces landowner opposition to regulation. We also show how compensation rules can limit the deadweight social costs of income transfers, while recognizing their effects on regulator and landowner behavior.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: regulatory takings, compensation, political economy

JEL Classification: K11, D72, L51

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 6, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Brennan, Tim and Boyd, James, Political Economy and the Efficiency of Compensation for Takings. Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 24, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=867108

Contact Information

Tim Brennan (Contact Author)
University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy ( email )
1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, MD 21250
United States
410-455-3229 (Phone)
410-455-1172 (Fax)
Resources for the Future ( email )
1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
James William Boyd
Resources for the Future ( email )
1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-328-5013 (Phone)
202-939-3460 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 704
Downloads: 84
Download Rank: 145,374
References:  39
Citations:  7

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.297 seconds