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The Effect of offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement

Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard University - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Howard F. Chang
University of Pennsylvania Law School



Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, pp. 489-513, 1999
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 164

Abstract:     
Under an "offer of settlement" rule, a party to a lawsuit may make a special offer to settle with the other party, such that if the other party rejects this offer, then this offer (unlike an ordinary offer) becomes part of the record in the case and may affect the allocation of litigation costs. Specifically, if the parties litigate to judgment, then the allocation of litigation costs may depend on how the judgment compares with the special offer. This paper develops a model of bargaining under offer-of settlement rules that can be used to analyze the effect that such rules have on the terms of settlement. The analysis first sets forth a general principle that identifies the settlement amount under any such rule. We then apply this principle to derive the settlement terms under the most important of these rules, and we identify a large set of seemingly different rules that produce identical settlements. Our results have both positive and normative implications.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: May 13, 1998 ; Last revised: May 07, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Chang, Howard F., The Effect of offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement (1999). Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, pp. 489-513, 1999; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 164. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=86752 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.86752


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Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-496-3119 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Howard F. Chang
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
215-573-8296 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
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