Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique
R. Glenn Hubbard
Columbia Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
December 2005
Abstract:
This paper is based on the author's comments at the Columbia University Symposium on Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation." The paper offers the author's perspective on the book as well as a different view on two issues: first, the starkly drawn differences between the arm's length bargaining model versus the managerial power model; and, second, the authors' preference for reduced-windfall options over restricted stock.
Keywords: Executive compensation, pay without performance
JEL Classifications: G30, J33, J44, K22
Working Paper Series
Suggested Citation
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique (December 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=868513
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