Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique
R. Glenn Hubbard
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
This paper is based on the author's comments at the Columbia University Symposium on Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation." The paper offers the author's perspective on the book as well as a different view on two issues: first, the starkly drawn differences between the arm's length bargaining model versus the managerial power model; and, second, the authors' preference for reduced-windfall options over restricted stock.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: Executive compensation, pay without performance
JEL Classification: G30, J33, J44, K22working papers series
Date posted: December 12, 2005
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