Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=868513
 
 

Citations (23)



 
 

Footnotes (4)



 


 



Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique


R. Glenn Hubbard


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 2005


Abstract:     
This paper is based on the author's comments at the Columbia University Symposium on Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation." The paper offers the author's perspective on the book as well as a different view on two issues: first, the starkly drawn differences between the arm's length bargaining model versus the managerial power model; and, second, the authors' preference for reduced-windfall options over restricted stock.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 8

Keywords: Executive compensation, pay without performance

JEL Classification: G30, J33, J44, K22

working papers series


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Date posted: December 12, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Hubbard, R. Glenn, Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique (December 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=868513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.868513

Contact Information

Robert Glenn Hubbard (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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Citations:  23
Footnotes:  4

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