Competition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships in Capital Markets
New York University - Leonard N. School of Business - Department of Economics
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
March 3, 2010
We show that information flows between investment banks and firms issuing securities affect the pattern of bank-firm relationships and that shocks to these information flows affect the real economy. Firms appear disinclined to share investment banks with other firms in the same industry, but only when the firms engage in product-market competition. This is consistent with concerns about the disclosure of commercially sensitive information to strategic rivals governing firms’ investment bank choices. Using exogenous shocks to information flows arising from mergers among banks, we show that the desire to avoid sharing investment banks has a substantial effect on affected firms’ investment in capital stock. We discuss how these information effects might help us understand how the investment banking industry is structured, how banks compete, and how prices are set.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: Investment banking, Securities underwriting, Competition, Bank deregulation, Bank entry, Glass-Steagall Act, Commercial banks
JEL Classification: G21, G24, G28, K22, L11, L14, L84
Date posted: December 13, 2005 ; Last revised: May 18, 2010
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