Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence
Frank P. Maier-Rigaud
IESEG School of Management, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; Lille - Economics & Management (LEM) - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - Competition Division; European Commission, DG Competition; Laboratory for Experimental Economics, University of Bonn; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics
Europe Economics; University of Navarra
MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2005/24
We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant. This effect is in contrast to alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 14
Keywords: Experiment, Public Good, Ostracism
JEL Classification: C92, H41working papers series
Date posted: December 8, 2005
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