What to Do About Bad Patents

3 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2005 Last revised: 14 May 2020

See all articles by Mark A. Lemley

Mark A. Lemley

Stanford Law School

Douglas Lichtman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Bhaven N. Sampat

Columbia University - Mailman School of Public Health; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

At the time patent applications are reviewed, the Patent and Trademark Office has no way of identifying the small number of applications that are likely to end up having real economic significance. Thus patent applications are for the most part treated alike, with every application getting the same - and by necessity sparse - review. In this short magazine piece, we urge in response three basic reforms. First, we would weaken the presumption of validity that today attaches to all issued patents. The modern strong presumption simply does not reflect the reality of patent review; presumptions, in short, should be earned. Second, because legitimate inventors need as much certainty as the law can provide, we would give applicants the option of earning a presumption of validity by paying for a thorough examination of their inventions. Put differently, applicants should be allowed to "gold-plate" their patents by paying for the kind of searching review that would merit a strong presumption of validity. Third and finally, because competitors also have useful information about which patents worry them and which do not, we support instituting a post-grant opposition system, a process by which parties other than the applicant would have the opportunity to request and fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent. As we explain in the piece, these reforms would together allow the Patent Office to focus its resources on patents that might actually matter, and it would also both reduce the incentive to file patents of questionable validity and reduce the harm caused by such patents in any event.

Keywords: patent law, patent reform, patent, post-grant, gold-plate

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A. and Lichtman, Douglas Gary and Sampat, Bhaven N., What to Do About Bad Patents. Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 10-13, Winter 2005-2006 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=869826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869826

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Douglas Gary Lichtman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-267-4617 (Phone)

Bhaven N. Sampat

Columbia University - Mailman School of Public Health ( email )

600 West 168th St. 6th Floor
New York, NY 10032
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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