Citations (1)


Footnotes (45)



Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing

Daniel M. Klerman

USC Gould School of Law

December 1, 2005

74 Fordham Law Review 1759-73 (2006)
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 05-23
USC CLEO Research Paper No. C05-16

Trademark dilution needs to be rethought to ensure that it enhances social welfare. Blurring should only be considered harmful when it increases consumer search costs. The fact that a trademark calls to mind two different products should not itself be considered actionable. Blurring only causes real harm when it interferes with consumers' ability to remember brand attributes. The Coase Theorem suggests that anti-dilution statutes will not block beneficial, non-competing uses of a mark, because, if transactions costs are low and the use is socially beneficial, the trademark owner will license the use. Unfortunately, the "naked licensing" rule, which forbids unsupervised licenses, adds unnecessary transactions costs and blocks potentially beneficial uses. Some commentators think free riding is or should be the essence of dilution. If free riding causes no harm - no consumer confusion, no blurring, and no tarnishment - then it is socially beneficial and should be allowed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 14, 2005 ; Last revised: December 17, 2014

Suggested Citation

Klerman, Daniel M., Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing (December 1, 2005). 74 Fordham Law Review 1759-73 (2006); USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 05-23; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C05-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=870089 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.870089

Contact Information

Daniel M. Klerman (Contact Author)
USC Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://weblaw.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=227

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,184
Downloads: 314
Download Rank: 71,128
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  45

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.172 seconds