Abstract

  


 



Risk Aversion, Managerial Reputation and Debt-Equity Conflict


Yuri Khoroshilov


University of Ottawa, Telfer School of Management

Anna Dodonova


University of Ottawa - Telfer School of Management

Finance Letters, February 2006

Abstract:     
This paper investigates debt-equity conflict in a firm, shows that shareholders can solve it by delegating project choice decisions to a risk-averse manager, and argues that managers' desire to build reputation may allow to solve this conflict even in firms with risk-neutral managers.

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 19, 2005 ; Last revised: April 13, 2010

Suggested Citation

Khoroshilov, Yuri and Dodonova, Anna, Risk Aversion, Managerial Reputation and Debt-Equity Conflict. Finance Letters, February 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=870448

Contact Information

Yuri Khoroshilov
University of Ottawa, Telfer School of Management ( email )
55 E. Laurier
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada
613-562-5800, ext. 4768 (Phone)
Anna Dodonova (Contact Author)
University of Ottawa - Telfer School of Management ( email )
136 Jean-Jacques Lussier Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada
(613) 562 5800 + 4912 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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