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Does Medical Malpractice Reform Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter?

Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Thomas Stratmann
George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)


December 15, 2005


Abstract:     
Many states have passed medical malpractice law reforms in an effort to retain and attract physicians. However, it is unclear what the net public health effect of such reforms is. While reforms are likely to help states retain doctors, they also diminish incentives to provide a high level of health care. We provide empirical evidence that some malpractice reforms have helped states retain doctors while others have not. However, retention of doctors comes at a cost. We show that some malpractice law reforms have lowered the level of care provided, as indicated by an increase in infant mortality. This suggests that some of the tort reforms lead to worsening health outcomes.

Keywords: Malpractice, Tort Reform, Infant Mortality, Defensive Medicine, Physicians

JEL Classifications: I11, I12, I18, K13, K32, D00

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 19, 2003 ; Last revised: October 10, 2009

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Stratmann, Thomas, Does Medical Malpractice Reform Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter? (December 15, 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=870492 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.453481


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Contact Information

Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Thomas Stratmann
George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
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