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The Changing Landscape of EU Company Law


Joseph A. McCahery


Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Erik P. M. Vermeulen


Tilburg University - Department of Business Law; Philips International BV; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Kyushu University - Faculty of Law

September 2004

TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP2004-023

Abstract:     
This is a time of spirited debate about regulatory competition in Europe. Discussions about competitive lawmaking abound. At the same time, the introduction of the European Company and the further harmonization attempts by the European Commission puts questions about the necessity of EU intervention into the company laws regulated by the member states. We, however, see no cause for excitement on either front.

This article explains why not, drawing on analytical tools from law and economics. Analyzing the history of EU company law, we locate a stable noncompetitive equilibrium, which prevails in the EU. This equilibrium follows from member states that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda-setting in EU company law changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure, and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as recent case law of the European Court of Justice triggered a loud discussion about competitive lawmaking in the EU.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Company Law, Legal Evolution, Regulatory Competition

JEL Classification: K22, F15, G38

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Date posted: December 19, 2005  

Suggested Citation

McCahery, Joseph A. and Vermeulen, Erik P. M., The Changing Landscape of EU Company Law (September 2004). TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP2004-023. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=871075 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.871075

Contact Information

Joseph A. McCahery (Contact Author)
Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31-(0)13-466-2306 (Phone)
+31-(0)13-466-2323 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Duisenberg School of Finance ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Erik P.M. Vermeulen
Tilburg University - Department of Business Law ( email )
Philips International BV ( email )
1070 MX Amsterdam
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Kyushu University - Faculty of Law ( email )
6-19-1, Hakozaki, Higashiku
Fukuoka, 812-8581
Japan
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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