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Interconnected Networks


Paul De Bijl


CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis

Eric Van Damme


TILEC and CentER, Tilburg University

Gert Brunekreeft


Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Pierre Larouche


Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); College of Europe - Bruges; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School; Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Valter Sorana


Charles River Associates (CRA)

Natalya Shelkoplyas


affiliation not provided to SSRN

February 2005

TILEC Discussion Paper Series 2005-007

Abstract:     
In this paper, we take a critical perspective on the common regulatory reply to deal with call termination on mobile networks. The current policy tendency to deal with fixed-to-mobile call termination is to restrict attention to the defined relevant market (call termination on single networks is the usual outcome), establish substantial market power, and regulate the prices in question. This approach is understandable within the context of the regulatory framework in the EU, but it ignores important elements of the broader picture and therefore risks to be misguided from a welfare viewpoint. Compared to price controls, there exist alternative, less heavy-handed, ways to intervene, which are directly aiming at the root cause of the problem and can make access regulation unnecessary. For instance, inducing mobile operators to apply RPP instead of CPP is a straightforward and simple remedy, as it instantaneously eliminates the root cause of call termination monopolies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 175

Keywords: Telecommunications, Fixed-mobile call termination, Access regulation

JEL Classification: L41, L51, L96

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: November 9, 2006  

Suggested Citation

De Bijl, Paul W.J., Van Damme, Eric E.C., Brunekreeft, Gert, Larouche, Pierre, Sorana, Valter and Shelkoplyas, Natalya, Interconnected Networks (February 2005). TILEC Discussion Paper Series 2005-007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=871391

Contact Information

Paul W.J. De Bijl (Contact Author)
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis ( email )
P.O. Box 80510
The Hague, 2508 GM
Netherlands
+31 70 3383380 (Phone)
+31 70 3383350 (Fax)
Eric E.C. Van Damme
TILEC and CentER, Tilburg University ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 3045 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3066 (Fax)
Gert Brunekreeft
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Pierre Larouche
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email ) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)
College of Europe - Bruges ( email )
Dijver 11
B-8000 Brugge
Belgium
Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School ( email ) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)
Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )
Rue de l'Industrie 42
Brussels, 1040
Belgium
Valter Sorana
Charles River Associates (CRA) ( email )
1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States
Natalya Shelkoplyas
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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