Juan Carlos Botero
World Justice Project
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute
Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Emory University School of Law
World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 61-88, Spring 2003
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 29, 2008 ; Last revised: June 27, 2014
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