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Judicial ReformJuan Carlos BoteroThe World Justice Project Rafael La PortaDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Florencio Lopez de SilanesEDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute Andrei ShleiferHarvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Alexander VolokhEmory University School of Law World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 61-88, Spring 2003 Abstract: A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility. Accepted Paper Series Date posted: February 29, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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