Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=873718
 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Judicial Reform


Juan Carlos Botero


World Justice Project

Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alexander Volokh


Emory University School of Law


World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 61-88, Spring 2003

Abstract:     
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

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Date posted: February 29, 2008 ; Last revised: June 27, 2014

Suggested Citation

Botero, Juan Carlos and La Porta, Rafael and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei and Volokh, Alexander, Judicial Reform. World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 61-88, Spring 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=873718

Contact Information

Juan Carlos Botero (Contact Author)
World Justice Project ( email )
740 15th Street NW
2nd floor
Washington, DC 20005
United States
202 407 9330 (Phone)
202 747 5816 (Fax)
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes (Contact Author)
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Alexander (Sasha) Volokh
Emory University School of Law ( email )
1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-712-5225 (Phone)
404-727-6820 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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