Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery
Kevin E. Davis
New York University School of Law
American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 314-340, 2002
This article explains why states in which bribe payers are located (payor states) criminalize transnational bribery. It suggests that these initiatives can enable selfinterested payor states to improve the terms upon which their nationals obtain the services of foreign public officials. Although the legislation in question is not patently designed to further economic interests, it may be only partially enforced in a manner consistent with the economic interests of payor states. This implies that further attention should be devoted to analyzing how anti-bribery legislation is enforced.
Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 29, 2008
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