|
||||
|
||||
Early Decisions: A Regulatory FrameworkJohn Leonard BeshearsNational Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Stanford Graduate School of Business James J. ChoiYale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) David LaibsonHarvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Brigitte C. MadrianHarvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) January 2006 NBER Working Paper No. w11920 Abstract: We describe a regulatory framework that helps consumers who have difficulty sticking to their own long-run plans. Early Decision regulations help long-run preferences prevail by allowing consumers to partially commit to their long-run goals, making it harder for a momentary impulse to reverse past decisions. In the cigarette market, examples of Early Decision regulations include restricting the locations or times at which cigarettes are sold, delaying the receipt of cigarettes following purchase, and allowing a consumer to choose in advance the legal restrictions on her own cigarette purchases. A formal model of Early Decision regulations demonstrates that Early Decisions are optimal when consumer preferences are heterogeneous. Intuitively, each consumer knows his own preferences, so self-rationing - which is what Early Decisions enable - is better than a one-size-fits-all regulation like a sin tax. Of course, Early Decision regulations incur social costs and therefore require empirical evaluation to determine their net social value.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28 working papers seriesDate posted: June 1, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.703 seconds