Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=876778
 
 

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REASON-EXPLANATION AND THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND


Julia Tanney


affiliation not provided to SSRN


Ratio, Vol. 18, pp. 338-351, September 2005

Abstract:     
This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non-philosophical and non-theoretical) judgments about a person`s reasons for acting, and the following theses are defended. First, considering the circumstances in which the action occurs is often enough to remove our puzzlement as to why someone acts as she does. Second, in those situations where we need to enquire about the agent`s state of mind, this does not, in the normal case, lead us to look for hidden, inner events that are candidates for the causes of her action. Finally, even though there are cases in which the agent`s introspections, reflections, and deliberations are relevant to our search for reasons, such cases do not lend support to the idea that reasons are hidden or inner causes of action. This suggests a problem for most philosophical accounts of what it is to act for reasons and for most philosophical accounts of the nature of mental states.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: May 8, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Tanney, Julia, REASON-EXPLANATION AND THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND. Ratio, Vol. 18, pp. 338-351, September 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=876778 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00295.x

Contact Information

Julia Tanney (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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