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Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

Oguzhan C. Dincer
Illinois State University

Christopher J. Ellis
University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Glen R. Waddell
University of Oregon - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

June 2006

Abstract:
Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.

Keywords: Corruption, decentralization, yardstick competition, spatial autoregression

JEL Classifications: H20, H29

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 22, 2006 ; Last revised: December 21, 2006

Suggested Citation

Dincer, Oguzhan C., Ellis, Christopher J. and Waddell, Glen R., Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition (June 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877470

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Contact Information

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author) University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email ) Eugene, OR 97403 United States
Oguzhan C. Dincer Illinois State University ( email ) Normal, IL 61790-4200 United States
Glen R. Waddell University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email ) Eugene, OR 97403 United States 541-346-1259 (Phone) 541-346-1243 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email ) P.O. Box 7240 D-53072 Bonn Germany

Abstract

References (13)

Citations (3)

Date posted: January 22, 2006 ; Last revised: December 21, 2006

Suggested Citation

Contact Information

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author)

Oguzhan C. Dincer

Glen R. Waddell