Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (23)



 


 



Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development


Daniel M. Klerman


USC Gould School of Law


USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-1
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. C06-1

Abstract:     
Economic theory generally supports the idea that judicial independence, and, more generally, high quality courts, facilitate economic growth. Good, independent courts enforce contracts and protect property, and by doing so encourage the investment which is crucial for economic development. Nevertheless, judicial independence and good courts are not necessary to investment, because there are other mechanisms which can enforce contracts and protect property, albeit perhaps not as well as courts. Contracts can be enforced by reputation, without recourse to the courts. Similarly, the government can protect property through executive restraint and policing, even if constitutional protections are weak and private litigation is ineffective. Thus, economic growth often starts without strong courts, and efforts to improve the quality of the judiciary are often the consequence, not the cause, of economic development.

The empirical literature, to the extent that it has investigated the relationship between courts and economic growth, has focused on judicial independence. Judicial independence is, of course, only one aspect of quality courts. Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to measure and probably correlated with other indices of court quality. It thus serves as a rough proxy for the quality of legal infrastructure. There is some evidence that judicial independence is associated with economic growth, but the evidence is mixed and causation is unclear.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 25, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Klerman, Daniel M., Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development. ; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. C06-1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.877490

Contact Information

Daniel M. Klerman (Contact Author)
USC Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.klerman.com

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,816
Downloads: 367
Download Rank: 44,675
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  23

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.219 seconds