Abstract

  
 

References (24)



 


 



Political Parties and Network Formation


Topi Miettinen


Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

Panu Poutvaara


University of Helsinki - Department of Economics; Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
February 2006

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1918
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1663

Abstract:     
We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: political parties, two-sided platforms, rent-seeking, network formation

JEL Classification: D72, D85, L14

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 25, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Miettinen, Topi and Poutvaara, Panu, Political Parties and Network Formation (February 2006). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1918; CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1663. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877902

Contact Information

Topi Miettinen
Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
HOME PAGE: http://www2.hhs.se/SITE/homepages/topi.html
Panu Poutvaara (Contact Author)
University of Helsinki - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
HOME PAGE: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/poutvaar/
Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER) ( email )
FI-00014 Helsinki
Finland
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 538
Downloads: 83
Download Rank: 154,390
References:  24

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.312 seconds