Antidumping and the People's Republic of China: Five Case Studies

Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research Working Paper 98.2

15 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 1998

See all articles by Robert W. McGee

Robert W. McGee

Fayetteville State University - Department of Accounting

Yeomin Yoon

Seton Hall University - W. Paul Stillman School of Business

Date Written: May 1998

Abstract

The People's Republic of China has been the number one target of antidumping actions filed by the U.S. Commerce Department on behalf of various domestic industries. One reason for this special status is because the PRC is one of the world's lowest cost producers. Because of the cost structure of its industries and economy, as well as the fact that it tends to manufacture products at the low end of the quality scale, it is able to sell a wide range of products for lower prices than most competitors. Furthermore, because it is classified as a nonmarket economy, special rules must be used to determine the cost of production. It is unlikely that the frequency of antidumping actions will decline in the near future. Indeed, because the antidumping laws are becoming more widespread as a result of their adoption by every country that became a member of the World Trade Organization, it is likely that the number of antidumping actions filed against the PRC will increase in the years to come.

JEL Classification: F13, K2, L5, O53

Suggested Citation

McGee, Robert W. and Yoon, Yeomin, Antidumping and the People's Republic of China: Five Case Studies (May 1998). Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research Working Paper 98.2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=87811 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.87811

Robert W. McGee (Contact Author)

Fayetteville State University - Department of Accounting ( email )

Fayetteville, NC 28301
United States

HOME PAGE: http://robertwmcgee.com

Yeomin Yoon

Seton Hall University - W. Paul Stillman School of Business ( email )

400 South Orange Avenue
Finance Department
South Orange, NJ 07079
United States
973-761-9229 (Phone)

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