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Outside Director Liability: A Policy AnalysisBernard S. BlackNorthwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Brian R. CheffinsUniversity of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Michael KlausnerStanford Law School Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, 2006 ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 59/2006 Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 319 U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 54 Abstract: Outside directors of public companies play a central role in overseeing management. Nonetheless, they have rarely incurred personal, out-of-pocket liability for failing to carry out their assigned tasks, either in the litigation-prone United States or other countries. Historically, as threats to this near-zero personal liability regime have appeared, market and political forces have responded to restore the status quo. We suggest here reasons to believe that this arrangement is justifiable from a policy perspective, at least in countries where reputation and other extra-legal mechanisms provide reasonable incentives for outside directors to be vigilant.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 Keywords: outside directors, liability, corporate governance JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: January 25, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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