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U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation


Robert R. Bliss


Wake Forest University - Schools of Business

George G. Kaufman


Loyola University Chicago

January 2006

FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2006-01

Abstract:     
In the U.S., the insolvency resolution of most corporations is governed by the federal bankruptcy code and is administered by special bankruptcy courts. Most large corporate bankruptcies are resolved under Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. However, commercial bank insolvencies are governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and are administered by the FDIC. These two resolution processes - corporate bankruptcy and bank receiverships - differ in a number of significant ways, including the type of proceeding (judicial versus administrative); the rights of managers, stockholders and creditors in the proceedings; the explicit and implicit goals of the resolution; the prioritization of creditors' claims; the costs of administration; and the timeliness of creditor payments. These differences derive from perceptions that banks are special. This paper elucidates these differences, explores the effectiveness of the procedural differences in achieving the stated goals, and considers the potential economic consequences of the different structures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Bankruptcy, bank insolvency, insolvency resolution

JEL Classification: G21, G33, K23

working papers series


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Date posted: January 26, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Bliss, Robert R. and Kaufman, George G., U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation (January 2006). FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2006-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=878355 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.878355

Contact Information

Robert R. Bliss (Contact Author)
Wake Forest University - Schools of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 7659
Winston-Salem, NC 27109-7285
United States
336-758-5957 (Phone)
336-758-6133 (Fax)
George G. Kaufman
Loyola University Chicago ( email )
820 North Michigan Avenue
School of Business
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-915-7075 (Phone)
312-915-8508 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.luc.edu/faculty/gkaufma/
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