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Hierarchy and Authority in a Dynamic Perspective: A Model Applied to Donor Financing of Ngo Proposals


Boriana Yontcheva


International Monetary Fund (IMF) - IMF Institute

July 2003

IMF Working Paper No. 03/157

Abstract:     
This paper presents a dynamic game of strategic delegation between a principal and an agent. The principal can choose between two organizational designs: a traditional hierarchy where she retains authority over the choice of projects to be implemented or a delegation where she allows her agent to select the project. The key objectives of this model are to identify the long-run determinants of the principal's choice and verify the impact of the authority allocation on the agent's effort levels and on the principal's payoffs. We apply the model to the relationships between institutional donors and nongovernmental organizations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: hierarchies, strategic delegation, development aid, NGOs, dynamic games, principal-agent issues

JEL Classification: C70, D23, D82, L23

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Date posted: January 28, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Yontcheva, Boriana, Hierarchy and Authority in a Dynamic Perspective: A Model Applied to Donor Financing of Ngo Proposals (July 2003). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-23, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=879233

Contact Information

Boriana Yontcheva (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - IMF Institute ( email )
700 19 th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
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