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http://ssrn.com/abstract=879293
 
 

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Is Corporatism Feasible?


Giovanni Di Bartolomeo


Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law

Nicola Acocella


Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance

February 2005


Abstract:     
This paper investigates the effects of cooperation (corporatism) on macroeconomic performance by considering a rather standard policy game between the government and a monopoly union. We stress the shortcomings of the traditional way used to model cooperation in policy games (the maximization of the weighted sum of players' preferences), which only approximates the Nash product solution. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, since it often reduces the union's utility. In particular, we show that an inflation-neutral union will never find it profitable to cooperate with the government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this issue is however beyond the scope of this paper.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Employment, inflation, trade unions, government, corporatism, policy game, feasibility

JEL Classification: E24, E61, E31, E58, J51

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Date posted: January 30, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni and Acocella, Nicola, Is Corporatism Feasible? (February 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=879293 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.879293

Contact Information

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (Contact Author)
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law ( email )
via Castro del Laurenziano 9
Roma, 00191
Italy
Nicola Acocella
Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance ( email )
via del Castro Laurenziano, 9
Rome, RM 00161
Italy
+390649766359 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.memotef.uniroma1.it/newdip/utenti/acocellanicola/
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