Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management
GGH Garcia Associates
IMF Working Paper No. 00/57
A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 81
Keywords: Deposit insurance, comprehensive guarantee
JEL Classification: G18, G21, G22, G28, G30working papers series
Date posted: February 9, 2006
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.422 seconds