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Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom


Jan Kees Martijn


International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Hossein Samiei


International Monetary Fund (IMF)

December 1999

IMF Working Paper No. 99/170

Abstract:     
The U.K. monetary policy framework, which combines inflation targeting with operational independence, provides a suitable arrangement for focused and credible monetary policy. However, potential weaknesses could result from features that have not yet been fully tested: the credibility and transparency of the inflation forecasts, which form the core of policy decisions, have diminished as a result of independence; and the framework could encourage excessive activism and frequent changes in interest rates. Although policy coordination could also suffer from independence, the new partly rules-based fiscal and monetary regimes will promote overall macroeconomic stability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Inflation targeting, central bank independence, United Kingdom

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Date posted: February 10, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Martijn, Jan Kees and Samiei, Hossein, Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom (December 1999). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-22, 1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=880825

Contact Information

Jan Kees Martijn (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
Hossein Samiei
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
(202) 623-6356 (Phone)
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