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Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United KingdomJan Kees MartijnInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) Hossein SamieiInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) December 1999 IMF Working Paper No. 99/170 Abstract: The U.K. monetary policy framework, which combines inflation targeting with operational independence, provides a suitable arrangement for focused and credible monetary policy. However, potential weaknesses could result from features that have not yet been fully tested: the credibility and transparency of the inflation forecasts, which form the core of policy decisions, have diminished as a result of independence; and the framework could encourage excessive activism and frequent changes in interest rates. Although policy coordination could also suffer from independence, the new partly rules-based fiscal and monetary regimes will promote overall macroeconomic stability.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 Keywords: Inflation targeting, central bank independence, United Kingdom working papers seriesDate posted: February 10, 2006Suggested Citation |
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