Monetary Union in West Africa: Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why?
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department
Paul R. Masson
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; The Brookings Institution
Catherine A. Pattillo
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Division
IMF Working Paper No. 02/226
We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union. This feature, ignored by the monetary union literature for Europe, is potentially important in Africa. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. We conclude that monetary union with Nigeria would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries, unless it were accompanied by effective discipline over Nigeria`s fiscal policies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: Monetary union, West Africa, Africa, fiscal distortions
JEL Classification: E58, E61, E62, F33working papers series
Date posted: February 14, 2006
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