Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=881110
 
 

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Mismatch in Law School


Jesse Rothstein


University of California, Berkeley, The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy; University of California, Berkeley, College of Letters & Science, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Albert Yoon


University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

February 1, 2006

Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 881110
Princeton Law and Public Affairs Working Paper No. 07-008

Abstract:     
An important criticism of affirmative action policies in admissions is that they may hurt minority students who are thereby induced to attend selective schools. We use two comparisons to identify so-called mismatch effects in law schools, with consistent results. Black students attain better employment outcomes than do whites with similar credentials. Any mismatch effects on graduation and bar exam passage rates are confined to the bottom quintile of the entering credentials distribution, where selection bias is an important, potentially confounding factor. Elite law schools' use of affirmative action thus does not appear to generate mismatch effects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: affirmative action, mismatch, admissions, law school

JEL Classification: I21, J24, J44, J7, K30

working papers series


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Date posted: February 7, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Rothstein, Jesse and Yoon, Albert, Mismatch in Law School (February 1, 2006). Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 881110; Princeton Law and Public Affairs Working Paper No. 07-008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=881110 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881110

Contact Information

Jesse Rothstein (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley, The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy ( email )
2607 Hearst Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720-7320
United States
HOME PAGE: http://gsppi.berkeley.edu/faculty/jrothstein
University of California, Berkeley, College of Letters & Science, Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Albert Yoon
University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )
78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada
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